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Abstract
We consider a framework in which anonymity protocols are interpreted as noisy
channels in the information-theoretic sense, and we explore the idea of using the
notion of capacity as a measure of the loss of anonymity. Such idea was already sug-
gested by Moskowitz, Newman and Syverson, in their analysis of the covert channel
that can be created as a result of non-perfect anonymity. We consider the case in
which some leak of information is intended by design, and we introduce the notion
of conditional capacity to rule out this factor, thus retrieving a natural correspon-
dence with the notion of anonymity. Furthermore, we show how to compute the
capacity and the conditional capacity when the anonymity protocol satisfies certain
symmetries. We also investigate how the adversary can test the system to try to
infer the user’s identity, and we study how his probability of success depends on the
characteristics of the channel. We then illustrate how various notions of anonymity
can be expressed in this framework, and show the relation with some definitions
of probabilistic anonymity in literature. Finally, we show how to compute the ma-
trix of the channel (and hence the capacity and conditional capacity) using model
checking.
1 Introduction
In this paper we explore a general approach to measure the degree of anonymity
provided by an anonymity protocol. Such protocols try to hide the link between
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a set A of anonymous events and a set O of observable events. Events in A
represent the information that we want to hide from the potential attacker.
Ideally, we would like him to be totally unable to distinguish the events in A,
that is to deduce which of them really happened in a specific execution of the
protocol. Events in O are the ones that the attacker actually observes. They
should model all the possible outcomes of the protocol, from the point of view
of the attacker. We assume that in each execution of the protocol one event
a ∈ A and one event o ∈ O occur, and that o is disclosed to the attacker.
An anonymity system should prevent the attacker from deducing a given the
information about o and the knowledge about how the system works.
For example, a protocol could be designed to allow users to send messages to
each other without revealing the identity of the sender. In this case, A would
be the set of (the identities of) the possible users of the protocol, if only one
user can send a message at a time, or the powerset of the users, otherwise. On
the other hand, O could contain the sequences of all possible messages that
the attacker can observe, depending on how the protocol works.
Probability plays an important role in anonymity protocols. First of all these
protocols are very often probabilistic themselves. They use random primitives
and the anonymity guarantees are based on the attacker’s inability of deter-
mining the outcome of probabilistic choices. Clearly, the precise analysis of
such protocols requires probabilistic means. Moreover, the analysis performed
by the attacker can be also probabilistic, for example by gathering statisti-
cal information about the users. The attacker might not be able to find out
exactly which anonymous event happened, but he could obtain a distribu-
tion over A and draw conclusions of the form “user i sent a message with
probability 95%”.
In this paper we consider a probabilistic setting, where probability distribu-
tions can be assigned to the elements of A,O. As a consequence we will model
anonymous events by a random variable A on A and observable events by O
on O. From the point of view of the analysis, we are only interested in the
distributions of A,O. In particular, the joint distribution p(a, o) provides all
the information about the conjoint behavior of the protocol and of the users
that we need. From p(a, o) we can derive, indeed, the marginal distributions
p(a) and p(o), and the conditional distributions p(o|a) and p(a|o).
Most of the times, however, one is interested in abstracting from the specific set
of users and its distribution, and proving properties about the protocol itself,
aiming at universal anonymity properties that will hold no matter how the
users behave (provided they follow the rules of the protocol). To this purpose,
it is worth recalling that the joint distribution p(a, o) can be decomposed as
p(a, o) = p(o|a)p(a). This decomposition singles out exactly the contributions
of the protocol and of the users to the joint probability: p(a), in fact, is the
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probability associated to the users, while p(o|a) represents the probability
that the protocol produces o given that the users have produced a. The latter
clearly depends only on the internal mechanisms of the protocol, not on the
users.
This view of the protocol in isolation from the users brings us to consider the
protocol as a device that, given a ∈ A as input, it produces an output in O
according to a probability distribution p(·|a). This concept is well investigated
in information theory, where such kind of device is called channel, and it is
described by the matrix whose rows are the elements of A, the columns the
elements of O, and the value in position (a, o) is the conditional probability
p(o|a). The rationale behind this view will be discussed in more details in
Section 3.
1.1 Contribution
In this paper we investigate the idea of measuring the degree of anonymity
of a protocol in terms of the information-theoretic notion of capacity of the
protocol, seen as channel. Our original contribution consist of the following:
• We define a more general notion of capacity, that we call conditional capa-
city, which models the case in which some loss of anonymity is allowed by
design.
• We discuss how to compute the capacity and the conditional capacity when
the anonymity protocol satisfies certain symmetries.
• We investigate the relation between the channel’s matrix and the knowledge
that an attacker can gain on the anonymous actions (the channel’s inputs)
from the observables (the channel’s outputs). In particular, we consider
attackers following the Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, and we show
bounds on the probability of error (also known as Bayesian risk) regarding
the probabilistic information that the attacker can acquire.
• We compare the definition of with various probabilistic notions of anony-
mity given in literature, in particular perfect anonymity, relative anonymity,
and probable innocence. Finally, we show that the condition of probable in-
nocence corresponds to a certain information-theoretic bound.
• We show how to compute the matrix of a protocol using model checking
tools. We demonstrate our ideas in the dining cryptographers and Crowds
protocols, where we show how the parameters of each protocol affect its
anonymity.
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1.2 Related work
Several various formal definitions and frameworks for reasoning about anony-
mity have been developed in literature. These include approaches based on
process-calculi [1,2], epistemic logic [3,4], and “function views” [5].
Several methods and protocols to guarantee anonymity have also been pro-
posed. They are based on very diverse techniques, depending on the applica-
tion domain. For instance, in a recent work that has attracted much attention
[6], a notion called k-anonymity is satisfied if the information relative to each
person in a data release is indistinguishable from the one of at least other k−1
individuals in the same release. Such situation can be achieved by generalizing
some fields in the records and by suppressing others [7].
In this paper, we focus on protocols that use randomized mechanisms to
achieve anonymity. In such context it is natural to explore probabilistic and
information-theoretic approaches.
Probabilistic definitions of anonymity have been investigated in [8,4,9–11]. We
discuss the relation with these works in detail in Section 5.
A recent line of work has been dedicated to exploring the notion of anonymity
from an information-theoretic point of view [12,13]. The main difference with
our approach is that in those works the anonymity degree is expressed in terms
of entropy, rather than mutual information. More precisely, the emphasis is
on the lack of information that an attacker has about the distribution of the
users, rather than on the capability of the protocol to conceal this information
despite of the observables that are made available to the attacker. Moreover,
a uniform user distribution is assumed, while in this paper we try to abstract
from the user distribution and make no assumptions about it.
Channel capacity has been already used in an anonymity context in [14,15],
where the ability to have covert communication as a result of non-perfect ano-
nymity is examined. The difference with our approach is that in those works
the channels are constructed by the users of the protocol using the protocol
mechanisms, to the purpose of transferring information, and capacity is used
to measure the amount of information that can be transferred through these
channels. In our paper, we consider the channel to be an abstraction of the
protocol itself, and we use the capacity to measure the anonymity degree of the
protocol. However in [15] the authors also suggest that the channel’s capacity
can be used as an asymptotic measure of the worst-case loss of anonymity,
which is the idea that we explore in this paper. Note that in [15] the authors
warn that in certain cases the notion of capacity might be too strong a mea-
sure to compare systems with, because the holes in the anonymity of a system
might not behave like text book discrete memoryless channels.
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Zhu and Bettati propose in [16] a definition of anonymity based on mutual
information. The notion we consider is based on capacity, which is an abstrac-
tion of mutual information obtained by maximizing over the possible input
distributions. As a consequence, we get a measure that depends only on the
protocol (i.e. the channel) and not on the users (i.e. the input distribution),
which is an advantage because in general we don’t know the input distribution,
and it also depend on the users, and even with the same users, it may change
over time. Of course, in case we know a priori the input distribution, then the
definition of Zhu and Bettati is more precise because it gives the exact loss of
anonymity for the specific situation.
A different information-theoretic approach is taken in [17]. In this paper, the
authors define as information leakage the difference between the a priori ac-
curacy of the guess of the attacker, and the a posteriori one, after the at-
tacker has made his observation. The accuracy of the guess is defined as the
Kullback-Leibler distance between the belief (which is a weight attributed
by the attacker to each input hypothesis) and the true distribution on the
hypotheses.
Another approach close in spirit to ours is the one of [18]. In this work, the
authors use the Kullback-Leibler distance to perform a metric analysis of
anonymity. In our work, we use the notion of mutual information, which is a
special case of relative entropy. However, the specific application of relative
entropy in [18] is radically different from ours. We use it to compare the entropy
of the input of an anonymity protocol before and after the observation. They
use it to establish a sort of distance between the traces of an anonymity system.
In the field of information flow and non-interference there is a line of research
which is closely related to ours. There have been various works [19–23] in which
the high information and the low information are seen as the input and output
respectively of a channel. From an abstract point of view, the setting is very
similar; technically it does not matter what kind of information we are trying
to conceal, what is relevant for the analysis is only the probabilistic relation
between the input and the output information. The conceptual and technical
novelties of this paper w.r.t. the above works are explained in Section 1.1. We
believe that part of our framework and of our results are applicable more or
less directly also to the field of non-interference. Some of the results however,
for instance those based on the hypotheses of symmetry or weak symmetry
of the protocol’s matrix, seem to be specific of the anonymity setting, in the
sense that the assumptions would be too restrictive for the non-interference
case.
The relation between the adversary’s goal of inferring a secret from the observ-
ables, and the field of “hypothesis testing”, has been explored in other papers
in literature, see in particular [24–26]. To our knowledge, however, this is the
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first time that it is investigated in connection with the matrix of conditional
probabilities determined by the protocol.
1.3 Plan of the paper
Next section recalls some basic notions about information theory. In Section 3
we justify our view of protocols as channels and (loss of) anonymity as capacity
and conditional capacity, and we give a method to compute these quantities in
special symmetry cases. In Section 4 we consider the tests that an attacker can
make on the protocol in order to gain knowledge about the anonymous actions,
and we discuss the probability of error that limits the inferences based on such
tests. In Section 5, we relate our framework to other probabilistic approaches
to anonymity. Finally, in Section 6, we illustrate on two specific examples (the
dining cryptographers and Crowds) how to compute the channel matrix and
the degree of anonymity for a given protocol, possibly using automated tools.
2 Preliminaries on Information Theory
Being in a purely probabilistic setting gives us the ability to use tools from
information theory to reason about the uncertainty of a random variable and
the information that it can reveal about another random variable. In partic-
ular the notions we will be interested in are entropy, mutual information and
channel capacity. In this section we briefly revise these notions. We refer to
[27] for more details.
In general, we will use capital letters X, Y to denote random variables and the
corresponding calligraphic letters X ,Y for their set of values. We will also use
small letters x, y to represent values of these variables, p(x), p(y) to denote the
probability of x and y respectively and p(x, y) to denote the joint probability
of x and y.
Let X be a random variable. The entropy H(X) of X is defined as H(X) =
−
∑
x∈X p(x) log p(x). The entropy measures the uncertainty of a random vari-
able. It takes its maximum value log |X | when X’s distribution is uniform and
its minimum value 0 when X is constant. We usually take the logarithm with
a base 2 and measure entropy in bits. Roughly speaking, m bits of entropy
means that we have 2m values to choose from, assuming a uniform distribution.
The relative entropy or Kullback–Leibler distance between two probability dis-
tributions p, q on the same set X is defined as D(p ‖ q) =
∑
x∈X p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
.
It is possible to prove that D(p ‖ q) is always non-negative, and it is 0 if and
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only if p = q.
Now letX, Y be random variables. The conditional entropy H(X|Y ) isH(X|Y ) =
−
∑
y∈Y p(y)
∑
x∈X p(x|y) log p(x|y). Conditional entropy measures the amount
of uncertainty of X when Y is known. It can be shown that 0 ≤ H(X|Y ) ≤
H(X). It takes its maximum value H(X) when Y reveals no information about
X, and its minimum value 0 when Y completely determines the value of X.
Comparing H(X) and H(X|Y ) gives us the concept of mutual information
I(X;Y ), which is defined as I(X;Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ). Mutual informa-
tion measures the amount of information that one random variable contains
about another random variable. In other words, it measures the amount of
uncertainty about X that we lose when observing Y . It can be shown that it
is symmetric (I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X)) and that 0 ≤ I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X).
A communication channel is a tuple 〈X ,Y , p(·|·)〉 where X ,Y are the sets of
input and output symbols respectively and p(y|x) is the probability of observ-
ing output y ∈ Y when x ∈ X is the input. Given an input distribution p(x)
over X we can define the random variables X, Y for input and output respec-
tively. The maximum mutual information between X and Y over all possible
distributions p(x) is known as the channel’s capacity : C = maxp(x) I(X;Y ).
The capacity of a channel gives the maximum rate at which information can
be transmitted using this channel.
3 Loss of Anonymity as Channel Capacity
The notions discussed in previous section can be used to reason about the
information that the adversary obtains from the protocol. The entropy H(A)
of A gives the amount of uncertainty about the anonymous events, before
executing the protocol. The higher the entropy is the less certain we are about
the outcome of A. After the execution, however, we also know the actual
value of O. Thus, the conditional entropy H(A|O) gives the uncertainty of
the attacker about the anonymous events after performing the observation.
To compare these two entropies, we consider the mutual information I(A;O)
which measures the information about A that is contained in O. This measure
is exactly what we want to minimize. In the best case it is 0, meaning that we
can learn nothing about A by observing O (in other words H(A|O) is equal to
H(A)). In the worst case it is equal to H(A) meaning that all the uncertainty
about A is lost after the observation, thus we can completely deduce the value
of A (H(A|O) is 0).
As explained in the introduction, each execution of an anonymity protocol is
associated to the joint probability p(a, o) of the particular values taken by A,O
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Fig. 1. An anonymity channel
in that execution. This probability can be written as p(a, o) = p(a)p(o|a). In
our view, among these two values, p(o|a) can be considered as a characteristic
of the protocol, while p(a) depends only on the users. For instance, in a proto-
col for sender anonymity, A takes values on the set A of users, and p(a) is the
probability of user a being the sender. In some cases all users might have the
same probability of being the sender, in other cases a particular user might
send messages more often than the others. Since the design of the protocol
should be independent from the particular users who will use it, the analysis
of the protocol should make no assumptions about the distribution on A. On
the other hand p(o|a) gives the probability of o when a is the sender, so it
depends only on the internal mechanisms of the protocol, not on how often a
sends messages.
To abstract from the probabilities of the anonymous events, we view an anony-
mity protocol as a channel 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 where the sets of anonymous events A
and observable events O are the input and output alphabets respectively, and
the matrix p(o|a) gives the probability of observing o when a is the input. An
anonymity channel is shown in Figure 1. Different distributions of the input
will give different values of I(A;O). We are interested in the worst possible
case, so we adopt the definition of the loss of anonymity as the maximum
value of I(A;O) over all possible input distributions, that is the capacity of
the corresponding channel. We recall that this idea was already suggested in
[15].
Definition 1 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be an anonymity protocol. The loss of anony-
mity C of the protocol is defined as
C = max
p(a)
I(A;O)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions.
The loss of anonymity measures the amount of information about A that can
be learned by observing O in the worst possible distribution of anonymous
events. If it is 0 then, no matter what is the distribution of A, the attacker
can learn nothing more by observing the protocol. In fact, as we will see
in section 5.1, this corresponds exactly to notions of perfect anonymity in
literature [8,4,9]. However, as we discuss in section 5.3, our framework also
captures weaker notions of anonymity.
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Fig. 2. A simple elections protocol
As with entropy, channel capacity is measured in bits. Roughly speaking, 1
bit of capacity means that after the observation A will have one bit less of
entropy, in another words the attacker will have reduced the set of possible
users by a factor 2, assuming a uniform distribution.
3.1 Relative Anonymity
So far, we have assumed that ideally no information about the anonymous
events should be leaked. However, there are cases where some information
about the anonymous events is allowed to be revealed by design, without this
leak be considered as a flaw of the protocol. Consider, for example, the case
of a simple elections protocol, displayed in figure 2. For simplicity we assume
that there are only two candidates c and d, and that each user always votes
for one of them, so an anonymous event can be represented by the subset of
users who voted for candidate c. In other words, A = 2V where V is the set of
voters. The output of the protocol is the list of votes of all users, however, in
order to achieve anonymity, the list is randomly reordered, using for example
some MIX technique 1 . As a consequence, the attacker can see the number
of votes for each candidate, although he should not be able to find out who
voted for whom. Indeed, determining the number of votes of candidate c (the
cardinality of a), while concealing the vote expressed by each individual (the
elements that constitute a), is the purpose of the protocol.
So it is clear that after the observation only a fraction of the anonymous events
remains possible. Every event a ∈ A with |a| 6= n where n is the number of
votes for candidate c can be ruled out. As a consequence H(A|O) will be
smaller than H(A) and the capacity of the corresponding channel will be non-
zero, meaning that some anonymity is lost. In addition, there might be a loss of
anonymity due to other factors, for instance, if the reordering technique is not
uniform. However, it is undesirable to confuse these two kinds of anonymity
losses, since the first is by design and thus acceptable. We would like a notion
of anonymity that factors out the intended loss and measures only the loss
that we want to minimize.
1 In MIX protocols an agent waits until it has received requests from multiple users
and then forwards the requests in random order to hide the link between the sender
and the receiver of each request.
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In order to cope with the intended anonymity loss, we introduce a random
variable R whose outcome is the revealed information. In the example of the
elections protocol, the value of R is the cardinality of a. Since we allow to
reveal R by design, we can consider that R is known even before executing
the protocol. So, H(A|R) gives the uncertainty about A given that we know
R and H(A|R,O) gives the uncertainty after the execution of the protocol,
when we know both R and O. By comparing the two we retrieve the notion
of conditional mutual information I(A;O|R) defined as
I(A;O|R) = H(A|R)−H(A|R,O)
So, I(A;O|R) is the amount of uncertainty on A that we lose by observing O,
given that R is known. Now we can define the notion of conditional capacity
C|R which will give us the relative loss of anonymity of a protocol.
Definition 2 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be an anonymity protocol and R a random
variable defined by its set of values R and a probability matrix p(r|a, o). The
relative loss of anonymity of the protocol with respect to R is defined as
C|R = max
p(a)
I(A;O|R)
where the maximum is taken over all possible input distributions.
3.1.1 Partitions: a special case of relative anonymity
An interesting special case of relative anonymity is when the knowledge of
either an anonymous event or an observable event totally determines the value
of R. In other words, both A and O are partitioned in subsets, one for each
possible value ofR. The elections protocol of the previous section is an example
of this case. In this protocol, the value r of R is the number of votes for
candidate A. This is totally determined by both anonymous events a (r is the
cardinality of a) and observable events o (r is the number of c’s in o). So we
can partition A in subsets A0, . . . ,An such that |a| = n for each a ∈ An,
and similarly for O. Notice that an anonymous event a ∈ Ai produces only
observables in Oi, and vice versa.
In this section we show that such systems can be viewed as the composition
of smaller, independent sub-systems, one for each value of R.
We say that R is a deterministic function of X if p(r|x) is 0 or 1 for all r ∈ R
and x ∈ X . In this case we can partition X as follows
Xr = {x ∈ X | p(r|x) = 1}
Clearly the above sets are disjoint and their union is X .
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Theorem 3 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be an anonymity protocol and R a random vari-
able defined by its set of values R = {r1, . . . , rl} and a probability matrix
p(r|a, o). If R is a deterministic function of both A and O, under some non-
zero input distribution p(·) 2 , then the transition matrix of the protocol is of
the form
Or1 Or2 · · · Orl
Ar1 Mr1 0 . . . 0
Ar2 0 Mr2 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
Arl 0 0 . . . Mrl
and
C|R ≤ d ⇔ Ci ≤ d, ∀i ∈ 1..l
where Ci is the capacity of the channel with matrix Mri.
PROOF. First we show that the protocol matrix has the above form, that
is p(o|a) = 0 if a ∈ Ar, o ∈ Or′ with r 6= r
′. If p(o) = 0 then (since p(·) is
non-zero) then whole column of o is zero and we are finished. Otherwise, since
R is a deterministic function of A,O we have p(r|a) = 1 and p(r|o) = 0. Then
p(r, a|o) = 0⇒ p(r, o|a)
p(a)
p(o)
= 0⇒ p(r, o|a) = 0
Finally
p(r ∨ o|a) = p(r|a) + p(o|a)− p(r, o|a) = 1 + p(o|a)
so p(o|a) = 0 otherwise p(r ∨ o|a) would be greater than 1.
Now we show that C|R ≤ d iff Ci ≤ d, ∀i ∈ 1..l where Ci is the capacity of
the channel with matrix Mri , constructed by taking only the rows in Ari and
the columns in Ori.
(⇒) Assume that C|R ≤ d but ∃i : Ci > d. Then there exists a distribution
pi over Ari such that I(Ari;Ori) > d where Ari, Ori are the input and output
random variables of channelMri. We construct a distribution over A as follows
p(a) =


pi(a) if a ∈ Ari
0 otherwise
2 We require p(·) to assign non-zero probability to all users so that p(r|o) can be
defined unless the whole column is zero. Note that if R is a deterministic function
of O under some non-zero distribution, it is also under all distributions.
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It is easy to see that under that distribution, I(A;O|R) = I(Ari|Ori) which is
a contradiction since I(A;O|R) ≤ C|R ≤ d < I(Ari|Ori).
(⇐) The idea is that for each input distribution p(a) we can construct an input
distribution pr(a) for each sub-channel Mr and express I(A;O|R) in terms of
the mutual information of all sub-channels. We write I(A;O|R) as:
I(A;O|R)
= H(A|R)−H(A|R,O)
= −
∑
r∈R
p(r)
∑
a∈A
p(a|r) log p(a|r) +
∑
r∈R
o∈O
p(r, o)
∑
a∈A
p(a|r, o) log p(a|r, o)
= −
∑
r∈R
p(r)
[ ∑
a∈A
p(a|r) log p(a|r)−
∑
o∈O
p(o|r)
∑
a∈A
p(a|r, o) log p(a|r, o)
]
Moreover, we have
p(a|r) =


p(a)
p(r)
if a ∈ Ar
0 otherwise
p(o|r) =


p(o)
p(r)
if o ∈ Or
0 otherwise
Also p(a|r, o) = p(a|o) if o ∈ Or and p(a|r, o) = 0 if a /∈ Ar. Thus in the above
sums the values that do not correspond to each r can be eliminated and the
rest can be simplified as follows:
I(A;O|R) = −
∑
r∈R
p(r)
[ ∑
a∈Ar
p(a)
p(r)
log
p(a)
p(r)
−
∑
o∈Or
p(o)
p(r)
∑
a∈Ar
p(a|o) log p(a|o)
]
(1)
Now for each r ∈ R we define a distribution pr over Ar as follows:
pr(a) =
p(a)
p(r)
It is easy to verify that this is indeed a probability distribution. We use pr
as the input distribution in channel Mr and since, by construction of Mr,
pr(o|a) = p(o|a) we have
pr(o) =
∑
a∈Ar
pr(a)pr(a|o) =
∑
a∈Ar
p(a)
p(r)
p(a|o) =
p(o)
p(r)
Now equation (1) can be written:
I(A;O|R)
=
∑
r∈R
p(r)
[
−
∑
a∈Ar
pr(a) log pr(a) +
∑
o∈Or
pr(o)
∑
a∈Ar
pr(a|o) log pr(a|o)
]
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=
∑
r∈R
p(r)
[
H(Ar)−H(Ar|Or)
]
=
∑
r∈R
p(r)I(Ar;Or)
≤
∑
r∈R
p(r)d
= d
Where Ar, Or are the input and output random variables of channel Mr. Fi-
nally, since I(A;O|R) ≤ d for all input distributions we have C|R ≤ d. 2
3.2 Computing the channel’s capacity
For arbitrary channels, there is no analytic formula to compute their capacity.
In the general case we can only use numerical algorithms that converge to the
capacity, as we discuss in the end of this section. In practice, however, channels
have symmetry properties that can be exploited to compute the capacity in
an easy way. In this section we define classes of symmetry and discuss how to
compute the capacity for each class. Two classic cases are the symmetric and
weakly symmetric channels.
Definition 4 A matrix is symmetric if all rows are permutations of each
other and all columns are also permutations of each other. A matrix is weakly
symmetric if all rows are permutations of each other and the column sums are
equal.
The following result is from literature:
Theorem 5 ([27], page 189) Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be a channel. If p(·|·) is weakly
symmetric then the channel’s capacity is given by a uniform input distribution
and is equal to
C = log |O| −H(r)
where r is a row of the matrix and H(r) is the entropy of r.
Note that symmetric channels are also weakly symmetric so Theorem 5 holds
for both classes.
In anonymity protocols, users usually execute exactly the same protocol, with
the only difference being the names of the agents to whom they communicate.
So if a user a1 produces an observable o1 with probability p, it is reasonable to
assume that a2 will produce some observable o2 with the same probability. In
other words we expect all rows of the protocol’s matrix to be permutations of
each other. On the other hand, the columns are not necessarily permutations
of each other, as we will see in the example of Section 6. The problem is that o1
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and o2 above need not be necessarily different. We can have observables that
are produced with equal probability by all users. Clearly, these “constant”
columns cannot be the permutation of non-constant ones so the resulting
channel matrix will not be symmetric (and not even weakly symmetric).
To cope with this kind of channels we define a more relaxed kind of symmetry
called partial symmetry. In this class we allow some columns to be constant
and we require the sub-matrix, composed only by the non-constant columns,
to be symmetric. A weak version of this symmetry can also be defined.
Definition 6 A matrix is partially symmetric (resp. weakly partially sym-
metric) if some columns are constant (possibly with different values in each
column) and the rest of the matrix is symmetric (resp. weakly symmetric).
Now we can extend Theorem 5 to the case of partial symmetry.
Theorem 7 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be a channel. If p(·|·) is weakly partially sym-
metric then the channel’s capacity is given by
C = ps log
|Os|
ps
−H(rs)
where Os is the set of symmetric output values, rs is the symmetric part of a
row of the matrix and ps is the sum of rs.
PROOF. Let Os by the set of symmetric output values (the ones that corre-
spond to the symmetric columns) and On the set of the non-symmetric ones.
Also let r be a row of the matrix and rs the symmetric part of r. Since the
matrix is partially symmetric all rows are permutations of each other. As a
consequence:
H(O|A) = −
∑
o
p(o)
∑
a
p(o|a) log p(o|a) = H(r)
Moreover the columns in On are constant so for all o ∈ On, p(o) is independent
of the input distribution: p(o) =
∑
a p(a)p(o|a) = p(o|a
′) for some fixed a′. We
have
I(A;O)=H(O)−H(O|A)
=−
∑
o∈O
p(o) log p(o)−H(r)
=−
∑
o∈Os
p(o) log p(o)−
∑
o∈On
p(o|a′) log p(o|a′)−H(r)
=−
∑
o∈Os
p(o) log p(o)−H(rs)
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≤−
∑
o∈Os
ps
|Os|
log
ps
|Os|
−H(rs) (2)
= ps log
|Os|
ps
−H(rs) (3)
We constructed inequality (2) by taking a uniform distribution p(o) = ps
|Os|
of
symmetric outputs (the non-symmetric outputs have constant probabilities).
ps is the total probability of having an output among those in Os. Now if
we take a uniform input distribution p(a) = 1
|A|
then for all o ∈ Os : p(o) =∑
a p(a)p(o|a) =
c
|A|
where c is the sum of the corresponding column which
is the same for all symmetric output values. So a uniform input distribution
produces a uniform distribution of the symmetric output values, thus the
bound (3) is achieved and it is the actual capacity of the channel. 2
Note that Theorem 7 is a generalization of Theorem 5. A (weakly) symmetric
channel can be considered as (weakly) partially symmetric with no constant
columns. In this case Os = O, rs = r, ps = 1 and we retrieve Theorem 5 from
Theorem 7.
In all cases of symmetry discussed above, computing the capacity is a simple
operation involving only one row of the matrix and can be performed in O(|O|)
time.
In the general case of no symmetry we must use a numerical algorithm, like
the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm (see for instance [27]) which can compute the
capacity to any desired accuracy. However the convergence rate is slow (linear)
and the coefficient of the convergence speed gets smaller when the number of
input values increases.
4 Testing anonymous events
In this section we illustrate the relation between the channel’s matrix and
the possibility for the attacker of guessing the anonymous event from the
consequent observable event. This problem is known in statistics literature as
hypothesis testing. The idea is that we have a set of data or outcomes of an
experiment, and a set of possible alternative explanations (hypotheses). We
have to infer which hypothesis holds from the data, possibly by repeating
the experiment, and try to minimize the probability of guessing the wrong
hypothesis (probability of error).
We assume that the same hypothesis holds through the repetition of the exper-
iment, which means that the same user is re-executing the protocol multiple
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times, either forced by the attacker himself or by some external factor. For
instance, in Crowds ([10]) users send messages along randomly selected routes.
For various reasons this path might become unavailable, so the user will need
to create an new one, thus re-executing the protocol. If the attacker is part
of the path, he could also cause it to fail by stop forwarding messages, thus
obliging the sender to recreate it (unless measures are taken to prevent this,
as it is done in Crowds).
We also assume that the random variables corresponding to the outcomes
of the experiments are independent. This corresponds to assuming that the
protocol is memoryless, i.e. each time it is reactivated, it works according
to the same probability distribution, independently from what happened in
previous sessions.
In statistics there are several frameworks and methods for hypothesis test-
ing. We consider here the Bayesian approach, which requires the knowledge of
the matrix of the protocol and of the a priori distribution of the hypotheses,
and tries to infer the a posteriori probability of the actual hypothesis w.r.t.
a given observation or sequence of observations. The first assumption (knowl-
edge of the matrix of the protocol) is usually granted in an anonymity setting,
since the way the protocol works is public. The second assumption may look
too strong, since the attacker does not usually know the distribution of the
anonymous actions. We show, however, that under certain conditions the a
priori distribution becomes less and less relevant with the repetition of the
experiment, and, at the limit, it does not matter at all.
Let us introduce some notation. Given an anonymous event a, consider the
situation in which the user re-executes the protocol n times with the same a
as input event, and the attacker tries to infer a from the n observable outputs
of the protocol executions. Let O1, O2, . . . , On represent the random variables
corresponding to the observations made by the attacker, and let ~o denote a
sequence of observed outputs o1, o2, . . . on. As stated above, we assume that
O1, O2, . . . , On are independent, hence the distribution of each of them is
given by p(·|a), and their conjoint distribution p : On → [0, 1] is given by
p(~o|a) =
n∏
i=1
p(oi|a) (4)
Let fn : O
n → A be the decision function adopted by the adversary to infer
the anonymous action from the sequence of observables. Let Efn : A → O
n
be the function that gives the error region of fn when a ∈ A has occurred,
namely:
Efn(a) = {~o ∈ O
n | fn(~o) 6= a}
Finally, let ηn : A → [0, 1] be the function that associates to each a ∈ A the
probability of inferring the wrong input event on the basis of fn when a ∈ A
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has occurred, namely:
ηn(a) =
∑
~o∈Efn (a)
p(~o|a)
We are now ready to introduce the probability of error associated to anony-
mous action testing on a given anonymity protocol, following the lines of the
Bayesian approach (see for instance [27], Section 12.8).
Definition 8 Given an anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, a sequence of n ex-
periments, and a decision function fn, the probability of error Pfn is defined
as the probability weighted sum over A of the individual probabilities of error.
Namely:
Pfn =
∑
a∈A
p(a)ηn(a)
In the Bayesian framework, the best possible decision function is given by the
so-called maximum a posteriori rule, which, given the sequence of observables
~o ∈ On, tries to maximize the a posteriori probability of the hypothesis a
w.r.t. ~o. The a posteriori probability of a w.r.t. ~o is given by Bayes theorem
(aka Bayes Inversion Rule):
p(a|~o) =
p(~o|a)p(a)
p(~o)
We now define a class of decision functions based on the above approach.
Definition 9 Given an anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, and a sequence of
n experiments, a decision function fn is a Bayesian decision function if for
each ~o ∈ On, fn(~o) = a implies p(~o|a)p(a) ≥ p(~o|a
′)p(a′) for every a′ ∈ A.
The above definition is justified by the following result which is a straightfor-
ward consequence of known results in literature.
Proposition 10 Given an anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, a sequence of
n experiments, and a Bayesian decision function fn, for any other decision
function hn we have that Pfn ≤ Phn.
PROOF. Immediate from the fact that the maximum a posteriori rule min-
imizes the probability of error. See, for instance, [27], Section 12. 2
4.1 Independence from the input distribution
The definition of the Bayesian decision functions depends on the a priori prob-
ability distribution on A. This might look artificial, since in general such dis-
tribution is unknown. We will show, however, that under a certain condition
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on the matrix of the protocol, for n large enough, the Bayesian decision func-
tions and the associated probability of error do not depend on the distribution
on A.
The following definition establishes the condition on the matrix.
Definition 11 Given an anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, we say that such
protocol is determinate iff all rows are pairwise different, i.e. the probability
distributions p(·|a), p(·|a′) are different for each pair a, a′ with a 6= a′.
Next proposition shows that if a protocol is determinate, then it can be ap-
proximated by a decision function which compares only the elements along
the column corresponding to the observed event, without considering the input
probabilities. By “approximated” we mean that as n increases, the probability
of the subset of On in which the two functions give the same result converges
to 1.
This property is based on a remark in [27], page 316, stating that, for n
large enough, in the fraction p(~o|a)p(a)/p(~o|a′)p(a′) the factor p(a)/p(a′) is
dominated by the factor p(~o|a)/p(~o|a′) (provided, one needs to add, that the
latter is different from 1). In [27] they give also a sketch of the proof of this
remark; the proof of our proposition is is a development of that sketch.
Proposition 12 Given a determinate anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, for
any distribution p(·) on A, any Bayesian decision functions fn, and any de-
cision function gn : O
n → A such that gn(~o) = a implies p(~o|a) ≥ p(~o|a
′) for
all a′ ∈ A, we have that gn approximates fn. Namely, for any ǫ > 0, there
exists n such that the probability of the set {~o ∈ On | fn(~o) 6= gn(~o)} is smaller
than ǫ.
PROOF. For any value o ∈ O, and for any sequence of observable outcomes
~o ∈ On, let n(o, ~o) denote the number of o’s that occur in ~o. Let a be the
actual input. Observe that, by the strong law of large numbers ([27]), for any
δ > 0 the probability of the set {~o ∈ On | ∀o ∈ O |n(o, ~o)/n−p(o|a)| < δ} goes
to 1 as n goes to∞. We show that, as a consequence of the above observation,
the probability of the set S = {~o ∈ On | ∀a′ 6= a p(~o|a)p(a) > p(~o|a′)p(a′)}
goes to 1 as n goes to ∞. In fact, p(~o|a)p(a) > p(~o|a′)p(a′) iff
1
n
log
p(~o|a)p(a)
p(~o|a′)p(a′)
> 0
and
1
n
log
p(~o|a)p(a)
p(~o|a′)p(a′)
=
1
n
log
p(~o|a)
p(~o|a′)
+
1
n
log
p(a)
p(a′)
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−→
n→∞
1
n
log
p(~o|a)
p(~o|a′)
(since
1
n
log
p(a)
p(a′)
−→
n→∞
0)
=
1
n
log
n∏
i=1
p(oi|a)
p(oi|a′)
(by (4))
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
p(oi|a)
p(oi|a′)
=
1
n
∑
o∈O
n(o, ~o)log
p(o|a)
p(o|a′)
(by definition of n(o, ~o))
−→
n→∞
∑
o∈O
p(o|a)log
p(o|a)
p(o|a′)
(strong law of large numb.)
= D(p(·|a) ‖ p(·|a′)) (Kullback–Leibler distance)
> 0 (by determinacy)
Given a Bayesian decision function fn, consider now the set S
′ = {~o ∈
On | fn(~o) = a}. Because of the definition of fn, we have that S ⊆ S
′. Hence
also the probability of the set S ′ goes to 1 as n goes to∞. Following a similar
reasoning, we can prove that for any gn satisfying the premises of proposition,
the probability of the set {~o ∈ On | gn(~o) = a} goes to 1 as n goes to ∞.
We can therefore conclude that the same holds for the probability of the set
{~o ∈ On | gn(~o) = fn(~o)}. 2
Proposition 12 allows us to define a decision function, for n sufficiently large,
by comparing only the probabilities p(~o|a) for different a’s. These probabilities
are determined uniquely by the matrix and therefore no knowledge of the a
priori probability on A is required.
The conditional probability p(o|a) (resp. p(~o|a)) is called likelihood of a given
o (resp. ~o). The criterion for the definition of gn used in Proposition 12 is to
choose the a which maximizes the likelihood of o, and it is known in literature
as the maximum likelihood rule.
4.2 Bounds on the probability of error
In this section we discuss some particular cases of matrices and the corre-
sponding bounds on the error that can be introduced by the Bayesian decision
functions. Some more cases will be considered in the next section.
We start with the bad case (from the anonymity point of view), which is when
the matrix is determinate:
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Proposition 13 Given a determinate anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, for
any distribution p(·) on A, and for any ǫ, there exists n such that the property
gn(~o) = a implies p(~o|a) ≥ p(~o|a
′) for all a′ ∈ A
determines a unique decision function gn on a set of probability greater than
1− ǫ, and the probability of error Pgn is smaller than ǫ.
PROOF. Given ~o ∈ On, define gn(~o) = a iff a is the value of A for which
p(~o|a) is greatest. By following the same lines as in the proof of Proposition
12, we have that the set {~o ∈ On | ∀a′ ∈ A p(~o|a) > p(~o|a′)} has probability
greater than 1 − ǫ for n sufficiently large. Consequently, the choice of a is
unique.
As for Pgn, we observe that for n sufficiently large the set Egn = {~o ∈
On | ∃a′ ∈ A p(~o|a) ≤ p(~o|a′)} has probability smaller than ǫ. Hence ηn(a) =∑
~o∈Egn(a)
p(~o|a) < ǫ and Pgn =
∑
a∈A p(a)ηn(a) < ǫ. 2
Proposition 13 and its proof tell us that, in case of determinate matrices,
there is essentially only one decision function, and its value is determined, for
n sufficiently large, by the a for which p(~o|a) is greatest.
Consider now the opposite case, i.e. when there are at least two identical rows
in the matrix, in correspondence of a1 and a2. In such case, for the sequences
~o ∈ On such that p(~o|a1)(= p(~o|a2)) is maximal, the value of gn is not uniquely
determined, because we could choose either a1 or a2. Assuming that we choose
arbitrarily between them, and that the probability of choosing the wrong one
is uniformly distributed, we have that the probability of error is bound from
below as follows 3 : Pgn =
∑
a∈A p(a)ηn(a) ≥ p(a1)1/2 + p(a2)1/2.
More in general, if there are k identical rows a1, a2, . . . , ak, the lower bound to
the probability of error is Pgn =
∑
a∈A p(a)ηn(a) ≥ p(a1)(k− 1)/k+ p(a2)(k−
1)/k + . . .+ p(ak)(k − 1)/k.
The situation is slightly different if we know the a priori distribution and we
define the function fn. In this case, the criterion of maximizing p(a)p(~o|a)
reduces to maximizing p(a). Hence, observing the outcome of the protocol
does not add any information to what we already know. However, the a priori
knowledge can help to make a sensible guess about the most likely a. This is
3 Note that this bound is strict. In fact, using the strong law of large numbers it is
possible to prove that, when either a1 or a2 is the actual input, the probability of
the set of the sequences ~o ∈ On for which p(~o|a1) (and p(~o|a2)) is maximal goes to
1 as n goes to ∞.
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not the case, of course, if in addition to rows a1 and a2 being identical we also
have p(a1) = p(a2).
5 Relation with existing anonymity notions
In this section we consider some particular channels, and we illustrate the
relation with probabilistic (non information-theoretic) notions of anonymity
existing in literature.
5.1 Capacity 0: strong anonymity
The case in which the capacity of the anonymity protocol is 0 is by definition
obtained when I(A;O) = 0 for all possible input distributions of A. From
information theory we know that this is the case iff A and O are independent
(cfr. [27], page 27). Hence we have the following characterization:
Proposition 14 Given an anonymity system 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉, the capacity of
the corresponding channel is 0 iff all the rows of the channel matrix are the
same, i.e. p(o|a) = p(o|a′) for all o, a, a′.
The condition p(o|a) = p(o|a′) for all o, a, a′ has been called strong probabilistic
anonymity in [9] and it is equivalent to the condition p(a|o) = p(a) for all o, a.
The latter was considered as a definition of anonymity in [8] and it is called
conditional anonymity in [4].
Capacity 0 is the optimal case, of course, also w.r.t. the capability of the
adversary of testing the anonymous events (cfr. Section 4): All the rows are
the same, hence p(~o|a1) = p(~o|a2) for all a1, a2 ∈ A, and ~o ∈ O
n. Consequently
the observations are of no use for the attacker to infer the anonymous event, i.e.
to define the “right” gn(~o), since all p(~o|a) are maximal. Assuming a uniform
distribution in assigning a value to gn(~o), the probability of error is bound
from below by (|A| − 1)/|A| (cfr. Section 4.2).
An example of protocol with capacity 0 is the dining cryptographers in a
connected graph [8], under the assumption that it is always one of the cryp-
tographers who pays, and that the coins are fair.
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5.2 Conditional capacity 0: strong anonymity “within a group”
In some anonymity protocols, the users are divided in groups and the protocol
allows the adversary to figure out to which group the culprit belongs, although
it tries to conceal which user in the group is the culprit. This is the case, for
example, of the dining cryptographers in a generic graph [8], where the groups
correspond to the connected components of the graph.
Such situation corresponds to having a partition on A and O, see Section 3.1.
The case of conditional capacity 0 is obtained when each Mri has capacity 0,
namely when in each group ri the rows are identical.
From the point of view of testing the anonymous events we note the following:
given a ~o ∈ On, there exists exactly one group ri of a’s such that p(~o|a) > 0,
and p(~o|a1) = p(~o|a2) for all a1, a2 in ri. Hence the attacker knows that the
“right” value of gn(~o) is an a in ri, but he does not know exactly which one.
In other words, on the basis of the observations the attacker can get complete
knowledge about the group, but remains completely uncertain about the exact
event a in the group, as expected. The lower bound on the probability of error
is (|Ar| − 1)/|Ar| where r ∈ R determines the set of maximal cardinality in
A.
Under the assumption that the coins are fair it can be shown that the dining
cryptographers in a generic graph has conditional capacity 0 ([8]).
One of the authors of [28], David Sands, has suggested to us that the notion of
strong anonymity “within a group” seems related to the notion of equivalence
classes in his work. Exploring this connection is left for future work.
5.3 Probable innocence: weaker bounds on capacity
Probable innocence is a weak notion of anonymity introduced by Reiter and
Rubin for the Crowds protocol [10]. In this section we focus on the definition
of probable innocence, a description and analysis of Crowds can be found in
Section 6.2.
Probable innocence was verbally defined as “from the attacker’s point of view,
the sender appears no more likely to be the originator of the message than
to not be the originator”. In literature there are three different definitions
[10,4,11] that try to formally express this notion, see [11] for details. In this
section we discuss the relation between these definitions and the channel ca-
pacity.
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5.3.1 Definition of Reiter and Rubin
In [10] Reiter and Rubin gave a verbal definition of probable innocence and
then formalized it and proved it for the Crowds protocol. Their formalization
considers the probability that the originator forwards a message directly to a
corrupted member (the attacker) and requires this probability to be at most
one half. The event of forwarding a message to the attacker is an observable
event: the attacker can detect it during the execution of the protocol. Thus,
Reiter and Rubin’s formalization of probable innocence considers the probabil-
ity of observable events produced by user ai when he executes the protocol
4 .
As explained in [11], this definition could be expressed in the framework of
this paper as follows: a protocol satisfies RR-probable innocence iff 5
p(o|a) ≤
1
2
∀o ∈ O, ∀a ∈ A (5)
In [11] it is argued that this definition makes sense for Crowds due to cer-
tain properties that Crowds satisfies, however it is not suitable for arbitrary
protocols.
We now show that RR-probable innocence imposes no bound on the capacity
of the corresponding channel. Consider, for example, the protocol shown in
figure 3. The protocols satisfies RR-probable innocence since all values of the
matrix are less than or equal to one half. However the channel capacity is (the
matrix is symmetric) C = log |O|−H(r) = log(2n)− log 2 = log n which is the
maximum possible capacity, equal to the entropy of A. Indeed, users can be
perfectly identified by the output since each observable is produced by exactly
one user.
Note, however, that in Crowds a bound on the capacity can be obtained due
to the special symmetries that it satisfies which make RR-probable equivalent
to CP-probable innocence.
5.3.2 Definition of Halpern and O’Neill
In [4] Halpern and O’Neill give a definition of probable innocence that focuses
on the attacker’s confidence that a particular anonymous event happened, after
performing an observation. It requires that the probability of an anonymous
4 Note that this probability has little to do with the probability of ai to actually
execute the protocol. The latter can be arbitrarily small or big.
5 Note that in [11] this definition is given as p(o|a) ≤ 12p(h) where p(h) is the
probability that the message passes at least once from the attacker. To simplify
the analysis we consider only the cases that this happens, in other words p(h) = 1.
This consideration is orthogonal to our discussion, the same result can be obtained
without it.
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o1 o2 o3 o4 · · · o2n−1 o2n
a1 1/2 1/2 0 0 . . . 0 0
a1 0 0 1/2 1/2 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
an 0 0 0 0 . . . 1/2 1/2
Fig. 3. A maximum-capacity channel which satisfies RR-probable innocence
event should be at most one half, under any observation. A protocol satisfies
HO-probable innocence iff
p(a|o) ≤
1
2
∀o ∈ O, ∀a ∈ A (6)
This definition looks like the one of Reiter and Rubin but its meaning is very
different. It does not limit the probability of observing o. Instead, it limits the
probability of an anonymous event a given the observation of o.
As discussed in [11], the problem with this definition is that it depends on
the probabilities of the anonymous events which are not part of the protocol.
As a consequence, HO-probable innocence cannot hold for all input distribu-
tions. If we consider a distribution where p(a) is very close to 1, then p(a|o)
cannot possibly be less than 1/2. So we cannot speak about the bound that
HO-probable innocence imposes to the capacity, since to compute the capacity
we quantify over all possible input distributions and HO-probable innocence
cannot hold for all of them. However, if we limit ourselves to the input distri-
butions where HO-probable innocence actually holds, then we can prove the
following proposition.
Proposition 15 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be a channel and p(a) a fixed distribution
over A. If the channel is symmetric and satisfies HO-probable innocence for
this input distribution then I(A;O) ≤ H(A)− 1.
PROOF. If X is a random variable and f a function on X , we will denote
by Ef(X) the expected value of f(X). Note that H(X) = −E log p(X) and
H(X|Y ) = −E log p(X|Y ).
We have
I(A;O) = H(A)−H(A|O) = H(A) + E log p(A|O)
And since p(A|O) ≤ 1/2 and both log and E are monotonic
I(A;O) ≤ H(A) + E log
1
2
= H(A)− 1
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2Note that we consider the mutual information for a specific input distribution,
not the capacity, for the reasons explained above.
5.3.3 Definition of Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi
The definition of [11] tries to combine the other two by considering both the
probability of producing some observable and the attacker’s confidence after
the observation. This definition considers the probability of two anonymous
events a, a′ producing the same observable o and does not allow p(o|a) to
be too high or too low compared to p(o|a′). A protocol satisfies CP-probable
innocence iff
(n− 1)p(o|a′) ≥ p(o|a) ∀o ∈ O, ∀a, a′ ∈ A (7)
where n = |A|. In [11] it is shown that this definition overcomes some draw-
backs of the other two definitions of probable innocence and it is argued that
it is more suitable for general protocols. In this section we show that CP-
probable innocence imposes a bound on the capacity of the corresponding
channel, which strengthens our belief that it is a good definition of anony-
mity.
Since the purpose of this definition is to limit the fraction p(o|a)
p(o|a′)
we could
generalize it by requiring this fraction to be less than or equal to a constant γ.
Definition 16 An anonymity protocol 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 satisfies partial anony-
mity if there is a constant γ such that
γ p(o|a′) ≥ p(o|a) ∀o ∈ O, ∀a, a′ ∈ A
A similar notion is called weak probabilistic anonymity in [29].
Note that partial anonymity generalizes both CP-probable innocence (γ =
n − 1) and strong probabilistic anonymity (γ = 1). The following theorem
shows that partial anonymity imposes a bound to the channel capacity:
Theorem 17 Let 〈A,O, p(·|·)〉 be an anonymity protocol. If the protocol is
symmetric and satisfies partial anonymity with γ > 1 then
C ≤
log γ
γ − 1
− log
log γ
γ − 1
− log ln 2−
1
ln 2
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PROOF. Since the channel is symmetric, by Theorem 5 its capacity is given
by log |O|−H(r) where r is a row of the matrix. We consider the first row which
contains values of the form p(o|a1), o ∈ O. Since the columns are permutations
of each other, we have ∀o∃a : p(o|a1) = p(o1|a). And since the protocol satisfies
partial anonymity we have ∀a, a′ ∈ A : γ p(o1|a
′) ≥ p(o1|a), thus
γ p(o′|a1) ≥ p(o|a1) ∀o, o
′ ∈ O (8)
First we show that when we decrease the distance between the probabili-
ties in a distribution then the entropy increases (this is a standard result
from information theory). Let ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) such that x1 < x2 and let
~xo = (x1 + d, x2 − d, . . . , xn) with d ≤ x2 − x1. We can write ~xo as a convex
combination t~x+(1− t) ~xp where t = 1−
d
x2−x1
and ~xp = (x2, x1, . . . , xn). Since
H(~x) = H( ~xp) and H(~x) is a concave function of ~x ([27]) we have
H( ~xo) = H(t~x+ (1− t) ~xp) ≥ tH(~x) + (1− t)H( ~xp) = H(~x)
Let p be the minimum value of the row r. By (8) the maximum value of r
will be at most γp. To maximize the capacity we want to minimize H(r) so
we will construct the row which gives the minimum possible entropy without
violating (8). If there are any values of the row between p and γp we could
subtract some probability from one and add it to another value. Since this
operation increases the distance between the values, it decreases the entropy
of the row as we showed before (in the inverse direction). So for a fixed p the
lowest entropy is given by the row whose values are either p or γp. After that
we can no longer separate the values without violating (8). However, this is
a local optimum. If we take a new p′ and construct a new row with values p′
and γp′ then we might find an even lower entropy.
Let x be the number of elements with value γp. Also let m = |O|. We have
(m− x)p+ xγp = 1⇒ p =
1
A
with A = x(γ − 1) +m
And the entropy of r will be
H(r) = h(x) = −(m− x)
1
A
log
1
A
− x
γ
A
log
γ
A
= (−x(γ − 1)−m)
1
A
log
1
A
− x
γ
A
log γ
= logA− x
γ
A
log γ
So H(r) is a function h(x) of only one variable x. We want to find the value
x0 which minimizes h(x). Note that x0 could be fractional, meaning that we
cannot split exactly the row into p0 and γp0 elements. In this case h(x0) will
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not correspond to an achievable probability of a row, but it will still be a lower
bound. First we derive h(x)
h′(x) =
1
ln 2
γ − 1
A
− γ log γ
m
A2
And x0 will be the value for which
h(x0) = 0⇒
1
ln 2
γ − 1
x0(γ − 1) +m
=
mγ log γ
(x0(γ − 1) +m)2
⇒
x0 =
A0 −m
γ − 1
with
A0 =
mγ log γ ln 2
γ − 1
Finally the minimum entropy of r will be equal to
h(x0) = log
mγ log γ ln 2
γ − 1
−
γ log γ
γ − 1
+
1
ln 2
= logm−
log γ
γ − 1
+ log log γ − log(γ − 1) + log ln 2 +
1
ln 2
And the maximum capacity will be
Cmax = logm− h(x0)
=
log γ
γ − 1
− log
log γ
γ − 1
− log ln 2−
1
ln 2
2
This bound has two interesting properties. First, it depends only on γ and not
on the number of input or output values or on other properties of the channel
matrix. Second, the bound converges to 0 as γ → 1. As a consequence, due
to the continuity of the capacity as a function of the channel matrix, we
can retrieve Proposition 14 about strong probabilistic anonymity (γ = 1)
from Theorem 17. A bound for probable innocence can be obtained by taking
γ = n−1, so Theorem 17 treats strong anonymity and probable innocence in a
uniform way. Note that this bound is proved for the special case of symmetric
channels, we plan to examine the general case in the future.
Concerning the testing of the anonymous events, it is interesting to note that,
if the attacker has the possibility of repeating the test with the same input an
arbitrary number of times, then probable innocence does not give any guar-
antee. In fact, condition 7 does not prevent the function p(~o|·) from having a
maximum with probability close to 1, for a sufficiently long sequence of ob-
servables ~o. So we can define gn(~o) to be such maximum, and we have that
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the probability of error corresponding to gn goes to 0. The only exception is
when two (or more) rows a1, a2 are equal and correspond to maximals. Impos-
ing this condition for all anonymous actions is equivalent to requiring strong
anonymity. In conclusion, probable innocence maintains an upper bound on
anonymity through protocol repetition only if the system is strongly anony-
mous. This result is in accordance to Proposition 17 in [11].
6 Computing the degree of anonymity of a protocol
In this section we discuss how to compute the channel matrix and the degree of
anonymity for a given protocol, possibly using automated tools. We illustrate
our ideas on two protocols from literature: the dining cryptographers ([8]),
and Crowds ([10]), while, at the same time, we try to convey some general
heuristic principles.
6.1 Dining cryptographers
6.1.1 Description of the protocol
This protocol, proposed by Chaum in [8], is arguably the most known ano-
nymity protocol in the literature. The protocol is usually demonstrated in a
situation where three cryptographers are dining together with their master. At
the end of the dinner, each of them is secretly informed by the master whether
he should pay the bill or not. So, either the master will pay, or he will ask one
of the cryptographers to pay. The cryptographers, or some external observer,
would like to find out whether the payer is one of them or the master. How-
ever, if the payer is one of them, they also wish to maintain anonymity over
the identity of the payer. Of course, we assume that the master himself will
not reveal this information, and also we want the solution to be distributed,
i.e. communication can be achieved only via message passing, and there is
no central memory or central coordinator which can be used to find out this
information.
The Dining Cryptographers protocol offers a solution to this problem. Each
cryptographer tosses a coin which is visible to himself and to his neighbor to
the right. Each cryptographer then observes the two coins that he can see,
and announces agree or disagree. If a cryptographer is not paying, he will
announce agree if the two sides are the same and disagree if they are not.
However, if he is paying then he will say the opposite. It can be proved that
if the number of disagrees is even, then the master is paying; otherwise, one
of the cryptographers is paying. Furthermore, if one of the cryptographers is
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paying, then neither an external observer nor the other two cryptographers can
identify, from their individual information, who exactly is paying, assuming
that the coins are fair.
The anonymity of the protocol is based on the fact that for each announcement
of the cryptographers under a payer i, there is a different configuration of the
coins producing the same announcement under a different payer j. Moreover,
if the coins are fair, these configurations have the same probability. However,
if the coins are not fair then strong anonymity is lost, since the coin configura-
tions are not equally probable and the attacker can assign higher probability to
a particular cryptographer. In the extreme case of totally biased coins, we can
expose the payer by comparing the announcements to the coin values (which
are fixed). In the following section we measure the degree of anonymity of the
protocol as a function of the bias of the coins.
6.1.2 Model-checking the protocol
To measure the degree of anonymity of a system, we start by identifying the
set of anonymous events, which depend on what the system is trying to hide.
In protocols where one user performs an action of interest (like paying in
our example) and we want to protect his identity, the set A would be the
same as the set I of the users of the protocol. In the dining cryptographers,
we take A = {c1, c2, c3, m} where ci means that cryptographer i is paying
and m that the master is paying. In protocols where k users can perform the
action of interest simultaneously at each protocol execution, A would contain
all k-tuples of elements of I. Another interesting case are MIX protocols, in
which we are not interested in protecting the fact that someone sent a message
(this is indeed detectable), but instead, the link between the sender and the
receiver, when k senders send messages to k receivers simultaneously. In that
case we consider the sets Is, Ir of senders and receivers respectively, and take
A to contain all k-tuples of pairs (a, a′) where a ∈ Is, a
′ ∈ Ir.
Then the set of observable events should also be defined, based on the visible
actions of the protocol and on the various assumptions made about the at-
tacker. In the dining cryptographers, we consider for simplicity the case where
all the cryptographers are honest and the attacker is an external observer (the
case of corrupted cryptographers can be treated similarly). Since the coins are
only visible to the cryptographers, the only observables of the protocol are the
announcements of agree/disagree. So the set of observable events will contain
all possible combinations of announcements, that is O = {aaa, aad, . . . , ddd}
where a means agree and d means disagree.
If some information about the anonymous events is revealed intentionally then
we should consider using relative anonymity (see Section 3.1). In the dining
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daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
c2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
c3 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
daa ada aad ddd aaa dda dad add
c1 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21 0 0 0 0
c2 0.21 0.37 0.21 0.21 0 0 0 0
c3 0.21 0.21 0.37 0.21 0 0 0 0
m 0 0 0 0 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.21
Fig. 4. The channel matrices for probability of heads p = 0.5 (top) and p = 0.7
(bottom)
cryptographers, the information about whether the payer is a cryptographer or
not is revealed by design (this is the purpose of the protocol). If, for example,
the attacker observes aaa then he concludes that the anonymous event that
happened is m since the number of disagree is even. To model this fact we
use the conditional capacity and we take R = {m, c} where m means that the
master is paying and c that one of the cryptographers is paying.
After defining A,O,R we should model the protocol in some formal proba-
bilistic language. In our example, we modeled the dining cryptographers in the
language of the PRISM model-checker ([30]), which is essentially a formalism
to describe Markov Decision Processes. Then the channel matrix of conditional
probabilities p(o|a) must be computed, either by hand or using an automated
tool like PRISM. In the case of relative anonymity, the probabilities p(o|a) and
p(r|a, o) are needed for all a, o, r. However, in our example, R is a deterministic
function of both A and O, so by Theorem 3 we can compute the conditional
capacity as the maximum capacity of the sub-channels for each value of R
individually. For R = m the sub-channel has only one input value, hence its
capacity is 0. Therefore the only interesting case is when R = c. In our ex-
periments, we use PRISM to compute the channel matrix, while varying the
probability p of each coin yielding heads. PRISM can compute the probability
of reaching a specific state starting from a given one. Thus, each conditional
probability p(o|a) is computed as the probability of reaching a state where the
cryptographers have announced o, starting from the state where a is chosen.
In Fig. 4 the channel matrix is displayed for p = 0.5 and p = 0.7.
Finally, from the matrix, the capacity can be computed in two different ways.
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Fig. 5. The degree of anonymity in the Dining Cryptographers as a function of the
coins’ probability to yield heads.
Either by using the general Arimoto-Blahut algorithm, or by using Theorem 7
which can be applied because the matrix is partially symmetric. The resulting
graph is displayed in Fig. 5. As expected, when p = 0.5 the protocol is strongly
anonymous and the relative loss of anonymity is 0. When p approaches 0 or
1, the attacker can deduce the identity of the payer with increasingly high
probability, so the capacity increases. In the extreme case where the coins are
totally biased the attacker can be sure about the payer, and the capacity takes
its maximum value of log 3.
6.2 Crowds
6.2.1 Description of the protocol
This protocol allows Internet users to perform web transactions without re-
vealing their identity. When a user communicates with a web server to request
a page, the server can know from which IP address the request was initiated.
The idea, to obtain anonymity, is to randomly route the request through a
crowd of users. The routing protocol ensures that, even when a user appears to
send a message, there is a substantial probability that he is simply forwarding
it for somebody else.
More specifically a crowd is a group ofm users who participate in the protocol.
Some of the users may be corrupted which means they can collaborate in order
to reveal the identity of the originator. Let c be the number of such users and
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Fig. 6. The Crowds protocol
pf a parameter of the protocol, explained below. When a user, called the
initiator or originator, wants to request a web page he must create a path
between him and the server. This is achieved by the following process, also
displayed in Figure 6.
• The initiator selects randomly a member of the crowd (possibly himself)
and forwards the request to him. We will refer to this latter user as the
forwarder.
• A forwarder, upon receiving a request, flips a biased coin. With probability
1 − pf he delivers the request directly to the server. With probability pf
he selects randomly, with uniform probability, a new forwarder (possibly
himself) and forwards the request to him. The new forwarder repeats the
same procedure.
The response from the server follows the same route in the opposite direction
to return to the initiator. Each user is considered to have only access to the
traffic routed through him, so he cannot intercept messages addressed to other
users.
It is easy to see that, with respect to the web server, the protocol offers
strong anonymity. The more interesting case, however, is the anonymity wrt
a corrupted user that participates in the protocol. In this case, the initiator
might try to forward the message to the attacker, so the latter can gain more
information than the end server. We say that a user is detected if he sends
a message to a corrupted user. Then it is clear that the initiator, since he
always appears in a path, is more likely to be detected than the rest of the
users. Thus detecting a user increases his probability of being the initiator,
so strong anonymity cannot hold. However, if the number of corrupted users
is not too big, the protocol can still satisfy probable innocence, meaning that
the detected user is still less likely to be the originator than all the other users
together, even though he is more likely than each other user individually.
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6.3 Model-checking the protocol
Consider a Crowds instance of m users of which n are honest and c = m− n
are corrupted. Since anonymity makes sense only for honest users we define
A = {a1, . . . , an} where ai means that user i is the initiator of the message.
The set of observables O depends on the attacker model, we could measure
sender anonymity wrt the end server or wrt the corrupted users of the protocol,
here we only consider the latter which is more interesting. The only thing that
a corrupted user can observe is a request to forward a message, coming from
another user of the protocol. Moreover, as it is usually the case in the analysis
of Crowds ([31,32]), we assume that a corrupted user will never forward a
message sent to him since by doing so he cannot learn more information about
the actual initiator. Thus, there is at most one observed user (the one who
sent the message to the corrupted user) and it is always an honest one. So we
define O = {o1, . . . , on} where oi means that the user i forwarded a message
to a corrupted user.
Again, the channel matrix p(o|a) can be computed either analytically or by
means of a model-checking tool like PRISM. The advantage of the second
approach is that with minimal changes we could compute the matrix for any
network topology, not only for the usual clique network, which is much more
difficult to do analytically. In fact, in [33] we use PRISM to compute the matrix
of Crowds in a grid network. Since PRISM can only check finite-state models,
we need to model Crowds as a finite-state system, even though its executions
are infinite. We use a similar model as in [31] where a state is defined by
the user who currently possesses the message, independently form the path
that the message followed to arrive there, so the number of states is finite.
In order for p(·|a) to be a distribution over A, we normalize all elements by
dividing with the total probability of observing any user. This corresponds to
computing all probabilities conditioned on the event that some user has been
observed, which is reasonable since if no user is observed at all then anonymity
is not an issue.
From the matrix we can compute the capacity, for the case of a clique network,
using Theorem 5 since the matrix is symmetric. As a consequence we only need
one row of the matrix, so we can only compute a single one to speed up model-
checking. For non-clique networks we can still compute the capacity using the
Arimoto-Blahut algorithm.
The resulting graph is displayed in Fig. 7. We have plotted the capacity of three
Crowds instances while varying the probability pf of forwarding a message in
the protocol. All instances have 50 honest users while the number of corrupted
ones is 10, 20 and 30 respectively. Firstly, we see that the whole graph of the
capacity is smaller when the number of corrupted users is smaller, which is ex-
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Fig. 7. The degree of anonymity for Crowds as a function of the probability pf of
forwarding a message. Three instances are displayed, with 50 honest users and 10,
20 and 30 corrupted ones. The expected path length is also displayed as a function
of pf .
pected since more corrupted users means higher probability of getting detected
in the first round. When pf = 0 then all instances have maximum capacity
log2 50, meaning no anonymity at all, since, if forwarding never happens then
the detected user is always the initiator.
For each instance we also indicate the minimum value of pf required to satisfy
probable innocence, given by the equation m =
pf
pf−
1
2
(c+ 1) ([10]). This value
is different for each instance (since m, c are different) however at this value all
instances have the same capacity C = H(pu)−H(p1/2) ≈ 1.8365 where pu is a
uniform distribution over A and p1/2 is a distribution that assigns probability
1/2 to one user, and uniform to all the others.
Finally, the expected length of the path to the server, equal to 1
1−pf
(as shown
in [10]) is displayed. As we can see from the graph there is a trade-off between
performance (expected path length) and anonymity (capacity) when selecting
a value for pf . Given the maximum number of corrupted users that we want
to consider, we can use the graph to find a value for pf that offers acceptable
capacity with a reasonable expected path length. The quantitative aspect of
the capacity is important in this case, since it provides more detail about
the connection between the degree of anonymity and pf , even in areas where
34
probable innocence is always satisfied or violated.
In these two examples, we see how the various results of this paper fit to-
gether when we analyze an anonymity protocol. We model the protocol by
considering the anonymous events A , the observable events O, and the ma-
trix p(o|a). In this framework, the loss of anonymity (Definition 1) gives an
intuitive measure of the anonymity degree of the protocol. In the case of rela-
tive anonymity the revealed information R and the probabilities p(r|a, o) need
also to be considered, and the relative loss of anonymity (Definition 2) needs
to be computed. Theorem 3 greatly reduces the size of the problem since we
only need to compute the traditional capacity of the sub-matrices of p(o|a).
Computing the capacity is further simplified by partial symmetry, we only
need to compute one row of the matrix and the computation of the capacity
is a very simple operation on this row. Finally, the actual computation of the
conditional probabilities can be fully automated using a model-checking tool
like PRISM.
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